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BAD BEGINNINGS
LARRY ALEXANDERt
INTRODUCTION
Like those movie monsters who, when dealt what surely should
be mortal wounds, manage to revive themselves and jump out at the
prematurely at ease, so too analogical reasoning in law-ARIL as I
shall call it-is back again in apparent triumph after having been
most recently attacked by Peter Westen' and Fred Schauer.2 ARIL's
virtues were proclaimed recently by both Cass Sunstein3 and Scott
Brewer 4 in the pages of the Harvard Law Review.
My aim in this Article is to convince you that, like those movie
monsters, ARIL is a fantasy. We can reason in law and about law in
a variety of ways, but none of those ways is ARIL. Moreover, like
those movie monsters, ARIL, were it to exist, would be deformed. It
would be deformed by the same process that creates human monsters:
bad beginnings.
In discrediting ARIL I mean also to discredit the notion that law
is an autonomous discipline with a distinctive form of reasoning.
Some who argue for law's autonomy are mystics:5 they assert that the
legally trained can directly grasp relevant similarities and differences
among cases without any further reasoning, that is, that legal training
produces a special (and presumably superior) way of seeing things.
Others are less mystical; they attempt to describe ARIL in terms of
familiar forms of reasoning such as deduction, induction, and abduc-
tion.' Nonetheless, these rationalists, like the mystics, believe ARIL
t Warren Distinguished Professor of Law, University of San Diego. I wish to thank
for their many helpful comments Scott Brewer, Bill Ewald, Heidi Hurd, Rick Kay, Tom
Morawetz, Michael Moore, Jeremy Paul, Stephen Perry, Curtis Reitz, Emily Sherwin,
and the participants in the faculty workshops at the University of Connecticut School
of Law and the University of Pennsylvania Law School.
I SeePeter Westen, On "Confusing ldeas" Reply, 91 YALE Lj. 1153 (1982).
2 See FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RuLES (1991).
3 See Cass R. Sunstein, On Analogical Reasoning, 106 HARV. L. REV. 741 (1993).
4 See Scott Brewer, Exemplary Reasoning. Semantics, Pragmatics, and the RationalForce
of Legal Argument by Analogy, 109 HARV. L. REV. 923 (1996).
5 The term is Brewer's. See id. at 951 (describing mystics as those "who place a high
degree of confidence in analogical argument even though they neither have nor feel
the need for an explanation of its characteristic concepts of 'relevance' and
'similarity'").
6 See id. at 926 (noting the "methodological reciprocity" between analogical
reasoning and the forms of argument associated with natural and demonstrative
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is a distinctive and legitimate form of reasoning. My critique of
ARIL extends to both its rationalist and mystical proponents and to
the autonomous methodology of law that they seek to advance.
Finally, I attempt to show how the most promising account of
ARIL is really Ronald Dworkin's account of law.7 Dworkin's juris-
prudence is an explanation and justification of both ARIL and law's
autonomy. Dworkin's account of ARIL is, however, untenable.
In case I be misunderstood, I should make clear at the outset that
in attacking ARIL, I am not attacking either normatively or descrip-
tively courts' reliance on precedent. Courts do cite precedents and
claim to be bound by them, and my argument discredits neither the
sincerity nor the tenability of that claim. I have previously analyzed
precedential constraint and concluded that precedent cases can
justifiably constrain later ones to the extent the former lay down rules
to govern the latter.8 My argument here is not that courts cannot
follow precedents, but that ARIL is not a satisfactory methodology for
doing so, either descriptively or normatively.
I. WHAT Is ARIL? THE VIEWS FROM THE LITERATURE
We first must get a clear grasp of ARIL's nature. ARIL is
frequently invoked, but infrequently described with any rigor or care.
We know that ARIL has something to do with comparing possible
resolutions of some present legal issue with past resolutions of
"similar" legal issues, and that ARIL is operating when we resolve the
present legal issue in a particular manner because of the way similar
issues were resolved in the past. But how do we determine whether
issues and their resolutions are "similar" or "dissimilar"? And does
ARIL operate only in common law decisionmaking, or does it operate
as well in decisions invoking canonical texts, such as statutes and
constitutions? We must answer these and other questions before we
can recognize our target.
A. Sunstein's Account of ARIL
Cass Sunstein recently described and praised ARIL in an article
sciences).
7 See RONALD DwORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986).
1 See Larry Alexander, Constrained by Precedent, 63 S. CAL. L. REv. 1 (1989).
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in the Harvard Law ReviewP and in a book." According to Sunstein,
when ARIL is employed in common law decisionmaking, a court looks
at precedent cases, grasps the norm implicit in them, and then applies
the norm to the case at hand." The norm need not be the ratio-
nale(s) given in the precedent cases. 2 Rather, the court employing
ARIL is free to interpret the precedent cases differently from the way
in which the precedent courts themselves understood those cases.
That in turn means that the new rationale given for those cases by the
present court is itself only provisional for, and revisable by, a future
court. Cases are precedents only for the results reached (the hold-
ings), not for the rationales given (the dicta)."s It is the rationale
that the present court finds immanent in the past results, not the
express rationales given for those results by the deciding courts, that
provides the basis for finding cases to be similar or dissimilar.
Sunstein not only describes ARIL but also applauds it. He sees
ARIL as a method by which members of a polity who hold quite
different moral and political theories can resolve conflict. Members
can come to agree that Case A is relevantly similar to Case B but not
to Case C, even in the presence of high-level theoretical disagree-
ment, because they can agree on the low-level-i.e., less abstract and
general-norms that provide the criteria for judgments of similarity
and dissimilarity. 4 These low-level rationales are what Sunstein calls
"incompletely theorized agreements,"'5 and they allow us to avoid
the stalemates that our conflicting views of the Good and Right would
otherwise produce. 6 In other words, even if we cannot agree among
ourselves about the relative merits of Nozick, Rawls, and Bentham,
we can agree that finding a brooch in the window frame of a
requisitioned house is more like finding banknotes on a shop floor
than like finding gold rings at the bottom of a pool." ARIL is the
' See Sunstein, supra note 3, at 742 ("[A]t least for law, [analogical reasoning] has
distinctive advantages over forms of thought that seem to be far superior.").
10 See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING AND POLITICAL CONFLICT (1996).
" See id. at 77-79.
12 See id. at 32.
'- See id. at 32, 71-72, 203.
14 See id. at 3-9, 62, 64.
'5 Id. at 14.
16 See id. at 3.
17 See Hannah v. Peel, 1 K.B. 509, 520-21 (1945) (holding that a brooch found in
a crevice on top of a indow frame belongs to the finder, not to the never-resident
owner of the house); South Staffordshire Water Co. v. Sharman, 2 Q.B. 44, 47 (1896)
(holding that two gold rings found at the bottom of a pool belong to the landowner,
not the finder of the rings); Bridges v. Hawkesworth, 21 LJ.Q.B. 75, 75-78 (1851)
(holding that banknotes found on a shopkeeper's floor belong to the finder, not the
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legal method of choice for the modern multicultural liberal state.
Nor does Sunstein restrict ARIL's domain to common law
decisionmaking.1s For him, ARIL can be legitimately employed in
both statutory and constitutional cases. If a statute forbids dogs in
restaurants, but expressly excepts guide dogs, how should the statute
be applied to the airport cop who brings his drug-sniffing dog into
an airport restaurant? Sunstein says this is a case for ARIL.' 9 Like-
wise, if the Constitution forbids punishing political protest but does
not forbid punishing draft card-burning, how should the Constitution
be applied to laws against flag-burning? Or if the Constitution
demands a trial-type hearing prior to revocation of welfare benefits,
but not prior to the revocation of disability benefits, what does it
demand prior to suspension from public school? Again, for Sunstein,
these are cases for ARIL.20 Indeed, even in easy cases of straight
deduction from clear canonical rules, interpreting those rules almost
always involves applying ARIL: we see that the green Honda before
us is "like" the blue Ford the legislature was picturing when it banned
cars in the park.2 ARIL, and the low-level, incompletely theorized
rationales it produces, is truly the most important legal methodology
for Sunstein.
B. Scott Brewer's Account of ARJL
Whereas Sunstein's actual account of ARIL is quite spare and
conclusory-we somehowjust grasp the rationales and the judgments
of sameness and difference they produce-Scott Brewer, in a recent
article, gives us a fuller account of ARIL and places that account
within the broader framework of reasoning by analogy generally.22
Both aspects of Brewer's piece merit close attention.
1. Argument Types, Logical Forms, and Rational Force
Brewer takes ARIL to be a special case of a more general type of
argument, which he calls "exemplary" or "analogical" argument.
2 3
(Brewer prefers the term exemplary to analogical, but nothing hangs
on the terminology.) Argument by example-analogical argument-
shopkeeper).
18 See SUNSTEIN, supra note 10, at 79-90.
11 See id. at 124-25; see also id. at 183.
20 See id. at 80-81.
21 See id. at 83-90, 203 n.26.
22 See Brewer, supra note 4, at 925-42.
23 Id. at 929.
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requires that we make judgments of relevant similarity and dissimi-
larity. How we make these judgments, however, is typically left
"largely mysterious and unanalyzed."24
We are left, then, with explanations of analogy that tend to fall
into either of two roughly divided camps: in one camp are those
who are deeply skeptical about the argumentative force of analogical
argument; in the other camp are those who evince an almost
mystical faith that, even though analogy does not have the rational
force of either induction or deduction, it still has some ineffable
quality that merits our entrusting it with deep and difficult matters
of state.
2
5
Brewer believes that analogical argument does have rational force
and that it is not mystical. In support of that belief, he taxonomizes
the various argument types, explains the logical form and rational
force of each type, and locates analogical reasoning within that
taxonomy.
a. Deductive Argument
One standard type of argument is the deductive or syllogistic
argument.26 In terms of logical form-the relation between the
truth of the premises and the truth of the conclusion-the truth of
the premises of a deductive argument guarantees the truth of the
conclusion. If it is true that all men are mortal and that Socrates
is a man, then it is true that Socrates is mortal. Thus, deductive argu-
ments have the most rational force of any argument type.
b. Inductive Argument
Brewer describes inductive arguments as being of two types:
inductive generalizations from particular instances and inductive
analogies from particular instances to other particular instances.
2
He illustrates these argument types as follows:
Imagine a chicken that reasons inductively... about a sequence
of events: on each of 500 successive days [days are the particular
individuals in the inductive premises], when the chicken hears a bell
(characteristic F), she comes out of her coop and gets fed (charac-
24 Id. at 933.
2 Id.
26 See id. at 943.
27 See id. at 942-43.
28 See id. at 944.
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teristic G). Thus the reconstructed inductive inference on day 501
looks like this:
(1) x, is a hear-bell day and x, is a get-fed day.
(OR: x, is an F (hear-bell day) and x, is a G (get-fed day))
(2) x2 is a hear-bell day and x2 is a get-fed day.
(x 2 is an F and x2 is a G)
(3) x3 is a hear-bell day and x3 is a get-fed day.
(x3 is an F and x3 is a G)
(500) x,00 is a hear-bell day and x5 00 is a get-fed day.
(x50 is an F and x500 is a G)
The two typical inductive conclusions to be drawn from these
premises are as follows:
Inductive generalization: Therefore, [probably] all hear-bell
days will be get-fed days. ([Probably] every x that is an F,
is a G.)
Inductive analogy: Therefore, [probably] day 501 [or some
other particular day], which is a hear-bell day, will [prob-
ably] be a get-fed day. (This particular x, which is an F,
[probably] is a G.)
2
1
Brewer points out that, in contrast to deductive arguments, "the
truth of the premises never guarantees the truth of the conclusion""0
of an inductive argument. Rather, "the truth of the premises
[merely] makes the truth of the conclusion more probable.""'
Therefore, the rational force of inductive arguments is less than the
rational force of deductive arguments.
c. Abductive Argument
An abductive argument typically has three steps. 32 At step one,
the abductive reasoner notices a phenomenon, P, that calls for
explanation. At step two, the abductive reasoner notes that P could
be explained by factor H. That is, the reasoner formulates an
explanatory hypothesis that could explain P, such as, "if H were the
case, then P would be explicable." At step three, the reasoner settles
on H as the tentatively correct explanation of P.
Brewer points out that the logical form of abductive reasoning is
29 Id. at 944-45 (all but first alteration in original) (foomotes omitted).
30 Id. at 945.
31 Id.
12 See id. at 947-48 (describing the three steps of an abductive argument).
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that of an invalid deductive argument: If H, then P; P, therefore
H.33 Nonetheless, abductive argument is important in the process
of scientific discovery, which depends on generating explanatory
hypotheses.
2. ARIL
Brewer's account of ARIL begins with abductive reasoning. There
is a "context of doubt." 4 For example, the court is unsure whether
the case before it-Case A-is more "like" Cases B, C, and D, which
would dictate one result, or is more "like" Cases X, Y, and Z, which
would dictate another result. The court provisionally abduces a rule
that would sort the existing cases-an "analogy-warranting rule" or
"AWR."35 It then confirms or disconfirms the AWR by reference to
explanatory orjustificatory rationales--"analogy-warranting rationales"
or "AWRas."36
The court may adjust the AWRs to fit both the AWRas and the
cases, adjust the AWRas to fit both the AWRs and the cases, or adjust
both the AWRs and the AWRas until the court reaches ajustificatory
or explanatory equilibrium. 7 Finally, the court applies the AWRs
it has thus confirmed to the case before it, Case A.38
Brewer continues:
Perhaps the single most important feature of argument by
analogy is this: in order for an argument by analogy to be compel-
ling-to have what I have called rational force-there must be
sufficient warrant to believe that the presence in an "analogized"
item of some particular characteristic or characteristics allows one
to infer the presence in that item of some particular other charac-
teristic. It is this sufficient warrant that I have labeled 'analogy-war-
ranting rule.' An analogy-warranting rule states the logical relation
between those characteristics of compared items that are known to
be shared and those that are inferred. Another important compo-
nent in a compelling argument by analogy is what I have called the
'analogy-warranting rationale.' Without undue linguistic legislation,
one may distinguish rules from rationales in this way: rationales
stand to rules in the two closely associated relations of explanation
and justification-that is, rationales explain and justify rules.
33 See id.
34 Id. at 962.
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 See id. at 963.3 See id.
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Accordingly, AWRs stand in these relations to AWRas. An analogy-
warranting rule states the logical relation that obtains between the
shared characteristics, on the one hand, and the inferred character-
istics, on the other. An analogy-warranting rationale explains why,
in the "eyes of the law" (when the analogical argument is legal), or
for the purposes of the argument (when the analogical argument
is nonlegal), the logical relation among the characteristics articulat-
ed by the analogy-warranting rule either does obtain or should ob-
tain.
3 9
It is clear that rules-the AWRs-play a large role in Brewer's
account of ARIL. Without the AWRs, we could not determine the
relevant ways in which cases are similar or dissimilar. It is the rule
"Drive fifty-five miles per hour" that makes my driving my Toyota
sixty-five miles per hour "like" your driving your Acura sixty-five miles
per hour and "unlike" her driving her Honda fifty miles per hour.
Yet Brewer distinguishes his account of ARIL from accounts like
Westen's ° or Schauer's4' in which rules do all the work and ARIL
is nothing but rule-based reasoning. As Brewer points out: "Rules
play a vital role in exemplary argument, but they do not comprise the
whole process. Two other critical elements in the process are the
discovery (what I have been referring to as 'abduction') of proposed
analogy-warranting rules, and the confirmation or disconfirmation of
those rules."42
In other words, for Brewer, ARIL is not reducible to the applica-
tion of rules. If it were, then in our reasoning we could dispense with
the precedent cases-the examples-and merely apply the rules to
the case at hand. What makes ARIL different from rule application
is the abductive search for an AWR in a context of doubt about the
rule, and the confirmation of that rule by reference to AWRas (as well
as the search for any "disanalogy-warranting" rules and rationales4").
3 Id. at 965 (footnote omitted).
4 See Westen, supra note 1, at 1162-63 (arguing that legal rules of decision are
necessarily formulated before, not after, any evaluation of a particular case's similarity
to other cases).
41 See SCHAUER, supra note 2, at 183-87 (explaining how one can derive a rule from
either a precedent case's canonical description of the facts, its canonical rationale, or
a "seemingly natural category" into which its facts fall).
42 Brewer, supra note 4, at 975.
1 The term is Brewer's. See id. at 1008.
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3. The Applications of ARIL
Like Sunstein, Brewer believes that ARIL is appropriate not only
in common law decisionmaking but also in statutory and constitu-
tional cases.44 He gives as two examples of ARIL's use in common
law decisionmaking the case of MacPherson v. Buick,45 a case that
Edward Levi called attention to as a paradigm of ARIL,46 and the
case of Adams v. New Jersey Steamboat Co.47 In MacPherson, the
question for ARIL was whether a wooden automobile tire was more
"like" a horse-drawn carriage, a circular saw, an oil lamp, a steamboi-
ler, and a soldering lamp (no liability without privity), or was more
"like" a coffee urn, a bottle of hair wash, a bottle of aerated soda, a
bottle of poison labeled as medicine, and a scaffold (liability without
privity)."s In Adams, the question was whether the theft of goods
from a passenger's cabin on a steamboat was more "like" the theft of
goods from a guest's room at an inn (strict liability for the innkeep-
er), or was more "like" the theft of goods from a railroad sleeper car
(no strict liability)."
In statutory cases, the ejusdem generis canon of construction
requires resort to ARIL." When general words follow specific words
in a statute, the general words are to be given a "'sense analogous to
that of the particular words."'51 Thus, in McBoyle v. United States,
52
the statute requiring interpretation, which forbade the knowing
interstate transport of a stolen "motor vehicle," defined "motor
11 See id. at 936 ("[T] his type of exemplary, analogical reasoning... is obviously
also thoroughly familiar.., in statutory and constitutional cases.").
41 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916) (applying liabilitywithoutprivity toa car manufacturer
and reasoning that a wooden automobile tire is similar to poisons, explosives, etc.,
because all are reasonably certain to place life and limb in danger if they are
negligently made).
46 See EDWARD H. LEvI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 6-19 (1949)
(describing MacPherson as representing the third phase of the cyclical movement in
legal concepts during which a concept is built up, fixed for a period of time, and then
broken down).
47 45 N.E. 369 (N.Y. 1896) (holding that the operator of a steamship is strictly liable
to passengers for theft of their personal property in the same way that a hotel is strictly
liable to its guests).
48 See MacPherson, 111 N.E. at 1052.
41 See Adams, 45 N.E. at 371.
11 See Brewer, supra note 4, at 937.
11 Id. (quoting Osborn v. Wilson & Co., 193 N.Y.S. 241, 242 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1922)).
52 283 U.S. 25, 27 (1931) ("It is impossible to read words that so carefully
enumerate the different forms of motor vehicles and have no reference of any kind
to aircraft, as including airplanes under a term that usage more and more precisely
confines to a different class.").
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vehicle" to include "an automobile, automobile truck, automobile
wagon, motor cycle, or any other self-propelled vehicle not designed
for running on rails.""3 The defendant had transported interstate
a stolen airplane. The Supreme Court, applying ejusdem generis, and
thus ARIL, held that an airplane was not within the scope of the gen-
eral words "any other self-propelled vehicle not designed for running
on rails."5 4
Finally, in constitutional cases, a good example of ARIL's role is
determining which classifications are "like" racial classifications for
purposes of applying the Equal Protection Clause.5 Another
example is found in California v. Carney,56 where the Supreme Court
had to determine whether, for purposes of the Fourth Amendment's
warrant requirement, a motor home was more like a house or a car.
4. ARIL and Reflective Equilibrium
The method of ARIL that Brewer describes and endorses is,
according to him, very close to the example-based form of reasoning
in normative philosophy known as the method of reflective equilibri-
um. 7 When employing that form of reasoning, the reasoner might
begin with normative judgments about particular examples, or she
might begin with some general moral principle that she accepts. She
may abduce a principle that would cover her examples, deduce
outcomes from that principle (or from the principle with which she
began) for other examples covered by the principle, and then test
those outcomes against her principle-unaided judgment regarding
how those examples should be resolved. If there is an inconsistency
between the principle she has abduced and her judgments about
some principle-dictated outcomes, she might search for a different
principle. Alternatively, if the principle seems attractive for other
reasons, she might reconsider her judgments about particular
examples, examining them for biases, irrelevant considerations, and
other sources of judgmental error.5  Moreover, the principle
abduced must not only be consistent with judgments about particular
53 Id. at 26.
54 Id. at 26-27.
" See Brewer, supra note 4, at 936-37.
56 471 U.S. 386 (1984) (holding that a warrantless search of a motor home does
not violate the Fourth Amendment because, although the motor home possesses some
attributes of a home, it is substantially similar to a vehicle and thus falls within the
vehicle exception).
17 See Brewer, supra note 4, at 938-39.
58 SeeJOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OFJUSTICE 46-53 (1971).
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examples, but also it must be consistent with background metaphysical
and empirical theories about human nature and social interaction.5 9
Now it is easy to see why Brewer believes the method of ARIL he
endorses is very similar, if not identical, to the method of reflective
equilibrium. As he describes the process of holistic adjustment of the
abduced AWRs and the background AWRas:
The reasoning device [here] is "reflective adjustment" of the sort
familiar from the work of Goodman and Rawls. Multiple "holistic"
adjustments are possible among an abduced AWR, a proposed
application of that AWR, and AWRas that might explain and justify
it. For example, an abduced AWR might be rejected because,
although it may be an attractive solution in some ways, it does not,
as applied to some particular cases, cohere sufficiently with expla-
natory andjustificatory rationales that the reasoner is unwilling to
" See Norman Daniels, Wide Reflective Equilibrium and Theory Acceptance in Ethics, 76
J. PHIL. 256, 256-61 (1979) (discussing the role of background theories in the method
of reflective equilibrium); Howard KlepperJustification and Methodology inPracticalEth-
ics, 26 METAPHILOSOPHY 201, 205-06 (1995). Klepper describes the holistic aspect of
reflective equilibrium as follows:
[Using the methodology of reflective equilibrium] we move back and forth
through the hierarchy of theory, principles, rules, and judgments, with
warrant to make changes at any level in order to produce coherence at and
among all levels. Where we choose to make a change when we discover some
inconsistency will be determined by pragmatic considerations such as
conservatism, simplicity, fecundity, and scope, in a manner analogous to the
contemporary Kuhnian view of theory acceptance in science .... A particular
judgment gains credibility from its coherence with a rule, which in turn gains
credibility from its coherence with both particular judgments and more
general principles, and so on.
In reflective equilibrium theory it is possible that a recalcitrantjudgment
could force a change in our deepest ethical theory, or our ethical theories
force a change in the most strongly held particularjudgment. In practice,
change is likely to be absorbed at the intermediary level of rules, or,
especially in the case of thosejudgments not so strongly held, at the level of
particularjudgment. This need not imply that we feel greater certitude for
theory than we do for rules or particularjudgments. It can be explained by
the pragmatic preference for conservatism that we display throughout.
Changing ethical theory or principles will likely necessitate greater change
at all other levels in order to maintain coherence than will change in
particular judgments, just because the theoretical claim is much more
general. The most popular technique of adjustment looks to the level of
rules, where we accommodate a recalcitrant judgment by creating an
exception to or further specification of the rule-one that coheres with both
that judgment and our accepted principles.
1996]
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amend. Or the AWR might be so compelling that the reasoner
chooses to hold onto the AWR and effect a modification of the ratio-
nales so that they can indeed provide an explanation of [sic]
justification of that AWR. Or it may be that an abduced AWR, al-
though adjudged to be adequately explained andjustified byAWRas
that the exemplary reasoner takes as her guide to true (or reliable)
judgments, turns out to yield particular results that are, at least
prima facie, unacceptable to the reasoner. Here again, two kinds
of adjustment are possible-revision of the AWR (and, if necessary,
the AWRa) to accommodate the rejection of this application of the
AWR, or holding fast to the AWR (and AWRa) while revising the
judgment that the application of the AWR in the contemplated
particular cases is, all things considered, unacceptable.
. . . "An analogy-warranting rule is amended if it yields a conclu-
sion we are unwilling to accept; a proposed conclusion is rejected
if it violates an analogy-warranting rule we are unwilling to
amend."
60
5. The Rational Force of ARIL
Brewer distinguishes his position on the rational force of ARIL
from those of two other camps: the mystics and the skeptics.
Sunstein is a mystic,6 as are Anthony Kronman 62 and Charles
Fried.6" They are mystics because they identify ARIL as involving the
intuitive grasp-of which perhaps only the wise, prudent, and legally
trained are capable-of principles immanent in precedent cases
without validating those immanent principles by recourse to plausible
higher-level principles from which the former follow deductively.
64
According to Brewer, there is "no better succinct statement of the
traditionalist-mystical view of analogy" than that of Fried:65
So what is it that lawyers andjudges know that philosophers and
economists do not? The answer is simple: the law. They are the
60 Brewer, supra note 4, at 1023 (footnotes omitted) (quoting NELSON GOODMAN,
FACT, FICTION, AND FORECAST 64 (4th ed. 1983)).
61 See id. at 952 ("The Wittgensteinian analogists are joined by Young Turk neo-
Aristotelian analogical mystics, whose leading figure among legal theorists is Cass
Sunstein.").
62 SeeANTHONYT. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER 170-85 (1993); see alsoBrewer, supra
note 4, at 952.
' See Charles Fried, The Artficial Reason of the Law or: What Lauyers Know, 60 TEx.
L. REv. 35, 57 (1981) ("Analogy and precedent are the stuff of the law.... [and]
[a] nalogy is the application of a trained, disciplined intuition . "); see also Brewer,
supra note 4, at 952.
64 See Brewer, supra note 4, at 952-53.6
5 Id. at 952.
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masters of "the artificial Reason of the law." There really is a dis-
tinct and special subject matter for our profession. And there is a
distinct method .... It is the method of analogy and precedent.
Analogy and precedent are the stuff of the law because they are the
only form of reasoning left to the law when general philosophical
structures and deductive reasoning give out, overwhelmed by the
mass of particular details. Analogy is the application of a trained,
disciplined intuition where the manifold of particulars is too
extensive to allow our minds to work on it deductively. This is not
a denial of reason; on the contrary, it is a civilized attempt to stretch
reason as far as it will go.66
The skeptics are represented by, among others, Richard Posner,67
Fred Schauer,6" and Peter Westen.69 Posner is a skeptic because,
while he agrees with Fried on what method lawyers employ, he denies
its rational force.7" Schauer and Westen are skeptics because they
believe that although ARIL may have rational force, it does so only
to the extent it is reducible to reasoning deductively from rules.7 '
Brewer describes himself as a "Modest-Proposal Rationalist."
72
He sides with the mystics insofar as his account of ARIL involves an
"uncodifiable imaginative moment," the moment of abductive
discovery of an AWvR.75 On the other hand, insofar as ARIL includes
deduction from AWRs to particular cases, Brewer sides with the
skeptics in recognizing the importance of rules and deductive
reasoning in ARIL. 4 He concludes that ARIL has rational force that
is a blend of the rational force of abduction and the rational force
of deduction.
7 5
66 Fried, supra note 63, at 57 (footnote omitted); see also Brewer, supra note 4, at
952 (quoting the same language).
67 See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 86-87 (1990)
("[R]easoning by analogy.... has an impeccable Aristotelian pedigree, but no definite
content or integrity." (footnote omitted)).
63 See SCHAUER, supra note 2, at 183-87 ("What distinguishes reasoning from
precedent from reasoning from rule, however, is the necessity in precedential
reasoning of constructing the generalization/factual predicate that already exists in the
case of a rule.").
69 See Westen, supra note 1, at 1163-64 (arguing that once one identifies the
prevailing legal rule, one can analogize and distinguish among cases using logic).
70 See POSNER, supra note 67.
71 See supra notes 1-2.
7 Brewer, supra note 4, at 954.
73Id.
74 See id.
75 See id. at 954-55.
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II. WHAT Is ARIL? A FRESH LOOK AT THE TERRAIN
A. The Possibilities
I would like the reader to summon up her basic knowledge of
common law cases, statutes, and constitutions, stripped to the extent
possible of the encrustations of her philosophical theories of legal
reasoning. My proposal is that when a case is decided, the decision,
if it is to be justified, must be justified in one of the following ways.
First, the decision may be justified by showing that it is morally
justified. The best method for establishing moral justifiability may
indeed be the method of reflective equilibrium. Thus, a decision in
a case may be justified by showing that it follows from moral princi-
ples that we (the justifiers) hold in reflective equilibrium. That the
decision so follows may require a very complex account, one that not
only looks at the facts of the case and the moral principles, but that
also considers extant rules, entrenched errors, institutional concerns,
epistemic limitations, reliance, and so forth. Nonetheless, argument
to moral principles via the method of reflective equilibrium, and from
those principles to results in particular cases via the facts of the case
and many other facts about the world, is one possible way ofjustifying
a result in a case. And to the extent that the method of reflective
equilibrium plays a role here, then, as Brewer correctly maintains,
reasoning from examples plays a role.
Second, a decision in a case may be justified by showing that it
follows deductively from an authoritative rule that governs the case.
The rule may be a constitutional rule, a statutory rule, or an adminis-
trative rule; or the rule may be one laid down by a court that has
authority to bind others to its rules. The principal task in cases of this
kind is not making the deductive inference; rather, it is establishing
what the rule means in the context of the case, i.e., interpreting the
rule.
I contend that these two types ofjustification exhaust the field for
law. Of course, there are complexities. Reasoning of the first type-
straightforward moral reasoning-may lead to the conclusion that an
authoritative rule, properly interpreted, is immoral or morally
suboptimal and should (or perhaps should not) be disregarded. Or,
moral reasoning might dictate that a court create a rule (legislate)
and apply that rule to the case before it, rather than apply moral
principles unaided by more specific (though morally blunter) rules.
(The rule that moral principles dictate may even produce a result in
the case before the court that is different from the result those princi-
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ples would dictate if unmediated by rules.)
This story about rules and moral principles is an old and familiar
one,7 6 but my claim is that it is the only story about legal justification
that makes such justification carry any rational warrant. If we lawyers
are to avoid the skeptics' charge of mysticism, then moral reasoning
76 See generally Larry Alexander, The Constitution as Law, 6 CONST. COMMENTARY 103
(1989); Alexander, supra note 8; Larry Alexander, The Gap, 14 HARV.J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
695 (1991); Larry Alexander, Law and Exclusionary Reasons, 18 PHIL. ToPIcs 5 (1990);
Larry Alexander, Pursuing the Good-Indirectly, 95 ETHICS 315 (1985); Larry Alexander
& Emily Sherwin, The Deceptive Nature of Rules, 142 U. PA. L. REv. 1191 (1994).
It is obvious that I am rejecting such "rational" methodologies as "decide the case
in a way that maximizes thejudges' (or the ruling class's) welfare." I am assuming that
law is at bottom a moral enterprise, one that has a moral point. A rational justification
in law is one that is rational within such a framework, not one that is rational within
some competing framework, such as that of advancing thejudges' self-interest. In any
event, ARIL is an implausible candidate for a rationally justified decisionmaking
procedure within these competing frameworks.
On the other hand, nothing in my account of the relation between moral
principles and posited authoritative rules precludes the rules from being quite broad,
as for example: "In deciding all cases, courts should try to maximize economic effi-
ciency and should ignore competing moral considerations." Such a rule might even
be a morally optimal rule forjudges to follow, though I strongly doubt it. In any event,
as long as these broad rules function as formal rules and not as "principles," see infra
Part III.C.2., they are not problematic for my account of rationally justified legal
methodologies.
In the end, law and its methodologies are a reflection of one central dilemma:
how to determine what is morallyjustified in particular situations. Whether because
people disagree about ultimate moral principles, or because they agree about ultimate
principles but not about what those principles require in concrete cases, moral
principles are not best implemented through each individual's deciding for herself
what those principles require case by case. Moral principles, rather, are best imple-
mented by rules-authoritative determinations of what ought to be done (substantive)
and who ought to decide (procedural). Law is what we call those authoritative
determinations or rules. But since all such rules are both fallible and also, even if ideal
as rules, over- and underinclusive relative to the moral principles they are designed
to implement, the moral principles and the rules are always in actual or potential
conflict. In cases of conflict, both citizens and legal officials must choose between
following the moral principles and following the rules. And even if the moral
principles require taking into account the morally bad consequences of rejecting rules
whenever they conflict with moral principles-that is, undermining the rules'
ruleness-the gap between what the moral principles require and what the rules
require cannot be eliminated. That "gap" is the dilemma of law and the source of the
intractable natural law/positivism dispute. Natural law focuses on the moral supremacy
of correct moral principles; positivism is concerned with the moral advantages of imple-
menting moral principles indirectly, through rules. And there is no third way, no via
media, between the horns of the dilemma. Any "weighing" of the rules will be in terms
of the correct moral principles, which will never dictate their own abandonment. That
is why rules cannot be weighed against moral principles, nor procedure against
substance. In the end, I view ARIL as a misguided attempt to chart a nonexistent via
media between moral principles and rules.
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and the interpretation of rules must exhaust our possibilities for legal
methodologies. Moreover, although both of these methodologies
have room for analogical reasoning of the type Brewer endorses, the
role for analogical reasoning in these methodologies cannot be what
Brewer, Sunstein, and others seek for ARIL.
Most importantly, if I am correct about the limited range of
justifiable methodologies in law, then analogical reasoning has
absolutely no role to play in common law decisionmaking based on
precedent cases, or in common law decisionmaking that treats statutes
or constitutional provisions like precedent cases. Yet, such common
law decisionmaking is supposed to be ARIL's natural home. If ARIL
is not there, then ARIL truly is a phantasm.
Therefore, I shall tentatively add to my list of legal methodologies
a third-the discernment of principles immanent in precedent cases
(or in statutes or constitutional provisions functioning like precedent
cases). In the next two Sections, I shall show why the role of
examples in moral reasoning and in the interpretation of canonical
rules cannot satisfy those who advocate ARIL. Then in Part III, I shall
turn to the third proposed methodology, the discernment of
immanent principles, and show that while this is the natural home of
ARIL, it fails to reckon with a problem that afflicts many monsters,
including ARIL: the problem of bad beginnings.
B. ARIL and Ambiguous Beginnings
1. ARIL and Common Law Decisionmaking
I want to assume the most favorable circumstances for ARIL and
that all the legal materials that the ARIL-employing lawyer or judge
must work with might be morallyjustified. That is, I want to assume
that the cases all might have reached morally correct decisions, even
if the stated rationales for those decisions are not morally correct.
The reason for severing the decisions from their stated rationales
is important. As Brewer recognizes, ARIL depends on the distinction
between decisions and their rationales;" if the rationales were
controlling, the reasoner could deduce the result in the present case
from the rationale laid down in the precedent case and would not
have to abduce AWRs and AWRas. In other words, when precedent
courts' rules rather than results constrain, only deductive reasoning
is required: the very point of Westen's and Schauer's skeptical
"' See Brewer, supra note 4, at 977-78.
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critiques of ARIL.7'
(Using as precedent statutory and constitutional rules, whose
interpretations are undisputed, to decide cases outside the scope of
those rules needs a slightly different account. Obviously, the statutory
or constitutional rule can be viewed as nothing more than the sum
of the possible cases that the rule governs. In that sense, there is no
distinction between the rule and the decisions in particular cases that
the rule produces. The structural analog, then, to severing court
decisions from their stated rationales is to sever the statutory or
constitutional rule from its background rationale(s) that otherwise
could-by deduction-do all the work in deciding cases beyond the
statutory or constitutional rule's scope.)
So, to recap briefly, we are to assume that all decisions to date
might be morally justified even if their stated rationales are not, and
that all statutory and constitutional rules might be morally justified
even if their actual background rationales are not. Further, we are
to assume that the case before us is not to be decided based on the
stated rationales of the cases or based on the actual rationales behind
any rules, and that the case does not come within the scope of the (by
hypothesis) possibly morallyjustified statutory or constitutional rules.
The question now is: can ARIL play a role in deciding the case at
hand?
My answer is that it cannot. In the scenario I have presented,
there is no reason not to use moral reasoning to discover what the
morally justified result is in the case at hand. But ARIL is not moral
reasoning.
Why is ARIL not just plain ordinary moral reasoning applied to
deciding a legal case? If the method of reflective equilibrium is the
methodology for discovering moral truths, then, as was pointed out
in Part I.B.4 above, in employing it we will make use of judgments
about particular cases. Is not reflective equilibrium reasoning from
examples, and is it not therefore a candidate for ARIL?
Reflective equilibrium is indeed a form of reasoning from
examples, but it cannot be ARIL. Consider these distinctions between
reflective equilibrium and ARIL.
First, the reasoner employing reflective equilibrium ultimately
tests the moral principles she is considering against her own moral
judgments about particular examples. Yet ARIL gives prominence to
others'judgments about particular examples, namely, the judgments of
78 See supra text accompanying notes 67-69.
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the precedent courts and the legislators. To be sure, the court
deciding the instant case must itself decide what the moral principles
are to which those judgments of others point. But it must accept
those moral judgments of others about particular examples as fixed
points in its own reasoning.
I do not mean to imply that the moral judgments of others have
no role in reflective equilibrium. Quite the contrary is true.
Nonetheless, those judgments of others are evidentiary for the
reasoner; they bear on the confidence she has in her own particular
judgments. The judgments of others are never canonical for her.
Moreover, she takes good evidence where she finds it. For her, the
particular moral judgments of the Harvard Philosophy Department
might carry significantly more weight than the judgments of the
Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas or the Pennsylvania legislature.
Yet ARIL subordinates the former to the latter. ARIL precludes her
from deciding that the particular judgments of the courts or the
legislature are incorrect, even if the inconsistent judgments of the
Harvard Philosophy Department, as incorporated into her own moral
judgments, would so declare. ARIL gives the particular judgments of
others-indeed, the particularjudgments of particular others, namely,
courts and legislatures-a different status from the status they would
have under reflective equilibrium.
A second difference between ARIL and reflective equilibrium lies
in the rigidity or fixity of the particular judgments with which the
reasoner must deal. If the reasoner were employing the method of
reflective equilibrium to determine the morally best decision in the
case before her, she might adjust not only her abduced moral
principles to fit with her particular judgments, but also her particular
judgments to fit with her moral principles. Whether she would adjust
her principles or judgments would depend on the relative degree of
confidence she had in each. As Brewer correctly notes, the adjust-
ments that occur in the method of reflective equilibrium are holistic
and at least potentially bidirectional."
ARIL, however, does not permit adjustment of the particular
judgments that serve as precedents. The particularjudgments about
carriages, saws, urns, lamps, and so forth that the MacPherson court
had to deal with were fixed for it. Those judgments could not be
revised to fit the court's moral principles. Nor could they be
disregarded. The same holds true, of course, for the particular
" See Brewer, supra note 4, at 939, 1023.
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judgments of legislatures embodied in statutes that a court wishes to
treat like precedent in reasoning, per ARIL, to a result in a case not
covered by the statute. This fixity or rigidity of the particular
judgments of others that ARIL must work with distinguishes ARIL
quite clearly from reflective equilibrium.
The third difference between ARIL and reflective equilibrium lies
in the rationale-filtered manner in which a court has access to prece-
dent cases. Precedent cases do not present themselves in all their
particularity to the court employing ARIL. Rather, the particularity
with which a present court can perceive a precedent case is entirely
dependent on the precedent court's opinion and the detail about the
case contained therein." .The amount and the selection of that
detail in the opinion will be a function of the precedent court's
rationale for deciding the case. The precedent court may have
favored a standard under which a large number of adjudicative facts
in the case were deemed material and worth mentioning in the
opinion. On the other hand, the precedent court may have favored
a broad, blunt rule that rendered most adjudicative facts in the case
entirely immaterial."'
Now as I have said, ARIL dispenses with the rationales of
precedent cases. The reason again is that ARIL is supposed to be
something other than deductive reasoning from rationales already
established. Nonetheless, ARIL cannot capture past cases in their full
particularity, but rather must confront them as stylized, rationale-
encrusted judgments of other courts.
Reflective equilibrium, on the other hand, allows and encourages
the moral reasoner to add facts to and to subtract facts from imagi-
nary situations in order to discern how her moral judgments are
affected and to identify the governing moral principles. The cases
that the moral reasoner considers can be as detailed and as custom-
ized as she wishes because they are products of her moral imagina-
tion, not actual past events whose description has been forever fixed
by others.
These three ways in which ARIL differs from the method of re-
so SeeAlexander, supra note 8, at 42-44 ("[A] spare recitation of facts characterized
at a high level of generality... seriously impedes the constrained court's determina-
tion of whether the constrained case is an a fortiori case or is instead distinguishable
on its facts from the precedent case.").
s' An example of such a broad rule would be: "John Doe entered into an
agreement withJane Roe. There was consideration present. John Doe did not do what
he agreed to do. We hold him liable to Jane Roe for damages caused by his breach."
The end.
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flective equilibrium are, of course, related. The fact that ARIL
depends on judgments of others explains why those judgments are
fixed and why they are rationale-encrusted. The bottom line is that
ARIL cannot be the method of reflective equilibrium, even though
the latter, like the former, relies on examples.
I do not wish to be misunderstood to be saying that a court
cannot take account of precedent cases and statutes while employing
reflective equilibrium to reach the morally best decision in the case
before it. If reflective equilibrium is the proper method for deter-
mining the morally correct course of action to take, then reflective
equilibrium will have to take account of facts about the world,
including past court decisions and their stated rationales and existing
statutes. These facts matter morally, but they do not matter in the
way ARIL describes. When we reason morally, we take account of
those facts.82 When we employ ARIL, we are supposed to be an-
chored to them.
2. ARIL and the Interpretation of Legal Rules
Brewer asserts that ARIL is used in statutory interpretation, as in
the ejusdem generis cases like McBoyle.83 I agree that a method similar
to ARIL can be employed to interpret statutes and other canonical
legal texts-just as a method similar to ARIL (reflective equilibrium)
can be employed in common law decisionmaking-but ARIL itself
cannot be so employed.
There are two basic approaches to interpreting canonical legal
texts. One is the approach of moral reasoning, which seeks to make
"the statute" (or "the Constitution" or "the rule in MacPherson")
morallyjustified. If reflective equilibrium is the proper methodology
for finding moral "truths," then reflective equilibrium-taking into
account the language of the rules, common understanding of that
language, the effects of various institutional arrangements, and other
such factors-is the correct moral approach to "interpreting"
canonical legal texts.
Although I would not call this moral approach to legal texts
"interpretation," and would instead refer to it as "doing what is
morally best in light of the legal texts," this is not the appropriate
82 See Alexander, supra note 8, at 15; Larry Alexander, Striking Back at the Empire:
A Brief Survey of Problems in Dworkin's Theory of Law, 6 LAW & PHIL. 419, 433 (1987);
Larry Alexander & Ken Kress, Against Legal Principles, in LAW AND INTERPRETATION 279,
299-300 (Andrei Marmor ed., 1995).
11 See Brewer, supra note 4, at 937-38.
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forum in which to enter that debate.84 Rather than reject the moral
approach to interpreting legal texts, I wish here merely to set it aside.
I do so because this approach to interpretation cannot be ARIL for
reasons articulated in the previous Section. I said there that if
common law decisionmaking were merely discovering the morally
correct course of action, then the method of reflective equilibrium-
which is not ARIL-is what is required. This point is equally
applicable if interpretation of legal texts is discovering the morally
correct course of action in light of those texts.
I thus put the moral approach to interpreting canonical legal texts
aside and turn to the other approach, which I shall call the empirical
approach. Crudely put, the empirical approach to interpretation
seeks to discover some nonnormative fact in the world that holds the
key to the legal text's authoritative meaning. The most important of
such empirical approaches are: 1) the approach that locates a text's
authoritative meaning in the intention of its author(s), and 2) the
approach that locates the meaning in the understanding of its
audience.
The relationship between the second and the first is complex.
Whatever their differences, however, they are similar with respect to
ARIL. I shall focus exclusively on the first approach (author's intent);
but my analysis of it will likewise be applicable to the second approach
(audience understanding) insofar as ARIL is concerned.
If we locate the authoritative meaning of a legal text in a fact
about the world, such as the intent of the text's author, then interpre-
tation of the text is an empirical matter, and our method is, broadly
speaking, scientific. For example, if we want to know what Congress
might have intended with respect to airplanes in a case such as
McBoyle, we look at the specific examples of motor vehicles in the
statutory text, abduce a hypothesis about Congress's intent, and test
that hypothesis by reference to possible rationales that Congress
might plausibly have found justificatory of that intent. Note the
parallels with ARIL: the particular examples, the abduction of an
AWR, and the testing of the AWR by reference to an AWRa. Note
also that the AWRa here is explanatory, notjustificatory. We seek to
84For my position on this debate, see Larry Alexander, All or Nothing at All? The
Intentions of Authorities and the Authority of Intentions, in LAW AND INTERPRETATION,
supra note 82, at 357 (arguing that the texts of legal authorities are the authorities'
determinations of whatis morally required of citizens, and that ascertaining what those
determinations are is ultimately a factual, rather than an evaluative, inquiry).
1996]
78 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
explain what Congress has done, not justify it. Our only interest in
the justificatory power of the AWRa is as it bears on the existential
plausibility of the AWR-here, Congress's intent-that it supports.
The fact that one version of Congress's intent is supported by a
stronger moral justification than another may strengthen-though it
surely does not guarantee-the inductive inference that Congress did
in fact possess the more justified intent.
Apparent similarities notwithstanding, this empirical approach to
legal interpretation is not ARIL, even in an explanatory rather than
ajustificatory mode. ARIL gives the examples from which it operates
a significance that no examples enjoy if we are merely reasoning
abductively and inductively to some fact' in the world, such as
legislative intent. If we want to know Congress's intent in McBoyle,
then we treat the statute's various examples of motor vehicles as
evidence of that intent. Furthermore, we may look beyond the statute
for other evidence of legislative intent, such as legislative history.
Remember, we are seeking to discover some fact about the world, and
anything that affects the probabilities surrounding that fact is
relevant. The words of the statute, although important evidence of
the intent we seek, are, for all that, merely evidence.
Under ARIL, however, the words of the statute are the evidentiary
universe. They are authoritative for interpreters in a manner
unparalleled by evidence in the purely empirical world, where all
evidence can be considered and none is incorrigible. To put it
differently and more bluntly, if interpretation of a legal text is the
search for a fact like legislative intent, and if that search is ARIL, then
ARIL is nothing special: it is merely the ordinary scientific method
of abduction and induction applied to the search for past facts of
legal significance. s5
" I shall say nothing here about the "practical reasoning" approach to
interpretation, which I find to be an incoherent "blend" of the normative (what would
be good orjust) and the descriptive (what the legislators intended, how the courts have
interpreted, etc.). See Larry Alexander, Practical Reason and Statutory Interpretation, 12
LAW & PHIL. 319,328 (1993) ("[N]orms and facts may constrain each other but cannot
'combine.'"). As far as I know, however, its proponents do not claim that it exemplifies
analogical reasoning. See also id. at 319 ("[Its proponents suggest that in interpreting
a statute, we should look at the words' meanings, ... norms regarding institutional
relationships, rule of law virtues, social norms, efficiency, and justice.").
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C. Tracking APJL to Its Lair: Immanent Legal Principles
Thus far, I have attempted to show that ARIL cannot be ordinary
moral reasoning that takes into account past legal decisions, and that
ARIL cannot be ordinary empirical inquiry into legislative intent (or
public understanding) that takes into account examples in legal texts.
If we look for ARIL in those precincts, we shall not find it.
There is an alternative location where I believe ARIL can be
found: ARIL is the method of divining legal principles immanent in
the case decisions and in the decisions of legislative bodies. ARIL is
not the method for understanding canonical legal texts, as I have
explained. Nor is it the method for applying canonical texts, which
is merely deductive. Rather, ARIL functions when a case is not
controlled by a canonical text, as when no extant text covers the case,
or when the text that covers it is not canonical and can be disregard-
ed, such as some accounts ofjudicial texts. What ARIL directs a court
to do in such situations is to find the legal principles immanent in the
legal materials and apply those principles to the case at hand.
Now, what are immanent legal principles? I am going to give the
best account of them I can, but because I am quite skeptical about
the normative status of immanent legal principles, my account should
be viewed warily.
Immanent legal principles are legal norms that are not posited
by any legal decisionmaker. As I said, if they were posited norms,
they would be subjects not for ARIL but for interpretation-empirical
inquiry-and deduction. Rather than being posited norms, immanent
legal principles arise from the posited legal materials, and justify
them. For example, the court in MacPherson could be described as
having found in the array of past cases-though not in their stated
rationales-the legal principle that it announced regarding negli-
gence and privity, which principle justified the decisions in both
MacPherson and in the precedent cases.
Just as immanent legal principles are not posited norms, neither
are they moral norms. Although they "justify" past legal decisions,
they do not do so morally, at least not straightforwardly. If they were
moral norms, then, as I have argued, they would be discovered
through the method of reflective equilibrium, not through ARIL.
ARIL as the method for discovering immanent legal principles
squares rather well with Brewer's account of ARIL. A court faced with
an array of past decisions, shorn of their nonauthoritative rationales,
abduces a principle (the AWR) that would fit with those past
decisions. It tests that principle for plausibility against background
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moral considerations (the AWRas). If the principle both fits the
decisions and is morally attractive, the principle is the principle
immanent in those decisions and is the gauge of relevant "likeness"
and "unlikeness" in analogical reasoning from the cases.
I think that this story about immanent legal principles is the best
account that can be given of ARIL. Notice that on this account ARIL
appears to be, as many of its advocates contend, not some mystical,
intuitive grasping of "likeness" and "unlikeness," but a form of
practical reasoning. Notice also that on this account ARIL explains
how past cases can constrain future decisions-as the principle of stare
decisis requires-even though the past cases are shorn of their
rationales. Notice finally that on this account ARIL truly is a
distinctive methodology of practical reasoning, one that can support
the autonomy of law.
Even as I have presented this account of ARIL so far, it has
problems. For example, because ARIL is supposed to operate on
judicial decisions and not the rationales for those decisions-else it
would be merely interpretation and deduction-we need some way
to overcome the problem to which I earlier adverted: judicial
decisions are accessible to later courts only through their rationales.
Nevertheless, I wish to assume that ARIL can overcome this problem.
A far greater problem confronts it-past mistakes.
III. BAD BEGINNINGS
A. The Possibility of Moral Error in Law
Judges may decide cases in ways that are morally unjustifiable.
Legislatures may legislate in ways that are morally unjustifiable. It is
difficult to imagine that anyone would gainsay these statements. For
how would one explain judges' and legislators' moral infallibility?
Even when courts are unanimous, we believe they may be morally
mistaken. And courts and legislatures are, quite frequently, seriously
divided over the justice of their decisions, sometimes with one vote
making the difference between one moral view and another.
Further, if we were to assume that courts-even divided courts-
always succeeded in doing justice in the particular case, we would
have to explain why they were not similarly infallible in stating
rationales. For if a court, employing ARIL, disregards past rationales
but treats past decisions as morally justified, it must assume that moral
infallibility in deciding cases does not translate into the moral
infallibility of the stated rationales. How could we account for this
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difference in courts' abilities?
Moreover, to assume courts' moral infallibility in deciding cases,
we must go beyond attributing to them moral infallibility with respect
to the cases before them standing in isolation. Because each court
is employing ARIL and looking at past cases as well as the case before
it, its decisions about the array of cases must also be morally infallible,
even though its view of past cases is filtered through the prism of
those cases' fallible rationales.
The moral infallibility account-no past moral mistakes embedded
in the law-not only plunges ARIL into mysticism, but also renders
ARIL unnecessary. If courts have infallible "case sense," then ARIL-
which purports to be a method of reasoning, which is always fallible-is
quite unnecessary and counterproductive. Why employ a fallible
reasoning method when one can infallibly "grasp" the correct decision
without it?
In light of these considerations, it seems quite clear that we must
assume ARIL is to operate in a world in which some past judicial
decisions, statutes, and so forth, are morally mistaken. We now face
an apparent paradox: ARIL is the method for finding the legal
principles that 'Justify" the morally unjustified.
B. Moral Error and Other Methodologies
The problem of moral error embedded in pastjudicial decisions,
statutes, and other legal materials does not affect the other method-
ologies I have described: ordinary moral reasoning to determine the
morally best decision in a case (the method of reflective equilibrium),
and ordinary empirical methodology to discover the meaning of a
legal rule qua legislative intent (or public understanding). Ordinary
moral reasoning will take account of all the present effects of past
decisions, including morally erroneous ones. Because we operate
morally in the world as we find it-a world in which many of its
features are the residue of past moral mistakes-we must take account
of those mistakes in order to act morally. For example, we surely
must take into account present reliance on past decisions, even if
those decisions were morally mistaken. And we must take into
account present institutional features when we reason morally about
what to do, even if those institutional features are not morally
optimal.
86
1 Some argue that past moral mistakes give rise to equality claims in the present;
I criticize that view infra Part III.C.2.
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Although moral reasoning must take account of past moral error
in the ways just described, it need not abandon correct moral
principles in doing so. In other words, it need not resort to any
norms other than the correct moral norms it discovers through
proper moral reasoning. Those norms dictate what to do in light of
past moral mistakes. Thus, past moral mistakes do not alter the
norms themselves, or the methodology for discovering them.
The same relation or lack of relation holds between past moral
error and the discovery of legislative intent. To the extent we can
explain past moral mistakes, we can be more confident that we have
correctly ascertained what some legislative body intended by its text
if our tentative conclusion is that the intent embraces the moral error.
Our method is always abductive and inductive in the ordinary manner
of empirical inquiry. We are still looking for the legally significant
fact-intent or understanding-and moral mistakes are just part of
the evidentiary stew. We do not seek principles to justify them, but
rather facts to explain them. And, of course, once we have interpret-
ed the rule, deduction is the only reasoning we need, for deduction
operates just as well from morally mistaken rules as from morally
correct ones.
To summarize, past moral mistakes can be handled by ordinary
empirical and normative methods. They are, of course, problems to
those adversely affected by them. They are not, however, problems
for the methodologies.
C. Dworkin's Domain
1. The Problem of Bad Beginnings
We have concluded that the most plausible account of ARIL is one
in which ARIL is neither ordinary moral reasoning nor ordinary
empirical reasoning. Rather, it is one in which ARIL seeks legal
principles immanent in past legal decisions, that is, principles that
justify those decisions. Those principles are what give us the criteria
of likeness and unlikeness required for analogical reasoning.
Our path has also shown us that, almost surely, many of the legal
materials in which the justifying legal principles are supposedly
immanent will turn out to be morally mistaken. The situation of a
judge or lawyer seeking the legal principles immanent in the legal
materials is therefore similar to that of a zoologist asked to continue
a project of sorting animals into "fish" and "mammals." The previous
zoologist who had begun the project had classified the animals she
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had studied in the following manner:
FISH
Flounder
Mackerel
Whale Shark
Whale
Porpoise
MAMMALS
Elephant
Bat
Kangaroo
Pig
The new zoologist now must classify a seal, and he must accept his
predecessor's classifications as authoritative. The question for him
thus becomes whether-given the predecessor's classifications-a seal
is more "like" a porpoise (fish) or more "like" a bat (mammal), or,
put differently, how the principles of mammaldom and fishdom
"immanent" in and "justificatory" of his predecessor's classifications
work in the case of seals.
It should be obvious that if the zoologist must treat his pre-
decessor's list as authoritative, he will find it impossible to classify
seals nonarbitrarily. He will, of course, be able to point to ways in
which seals are like and unlike both porpoises and bats, as he will
when he moves on to sea otters, river otters, beavers, raccoons, and
bears. (Note how the direction of progression through these
examples will affect his answers, which should not, but likely will be,
path-dependent.) All things are like and unlike all other things in
myriad ways. The zoologist needs the correct principles for classifying
fish and mammals, for only those principles will establish the relevant
bases forjudgments of likeness and unlikeness. Yet the predecessor's
bad beginning has made that impossible. Does not the same hold
true for a judge or lawyer employing ARIL in the real-world context
of past legal error?
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2. Dworkin the Magician
ARIL requires that we justify the unjustified. We obviously need
powerful magic to accomplish that feat. Fortunately, the law has such
a powerful magician in its service-Ronald Dworkin. Dworkin has
claimed to be able to 'Justify" mistakes and make the law the best it
can be. 7  Surely, Dworkin's domain is ARIL's natural home.
Indeed, ARIL is the methodology that has secured Dworkin his
empire in the law.88 Although Dworkin did not create ARIL, he took
ARIL and harnessed it to his cause. Dworkin has, of course, put
forward a jurisprudential theory in which legal principles immanent
in the legal materials play the major role.89 Those principles must
"fit" the legal materials (shorn of their rationales)-as the AWRs must
fit with the past cases-and must be the most morally acceptable of
the principles that satisfy the criterion of "fit," with moral acceptability
gauged by reference to correct moral principles (the AWRas).
Because of moral mistakes embedded in the legal materials,
however, the legal principles immanent in the legal materials-those
that score highest on the fit and acceptability axes-will differ from
correct moral principles. (In Brewer's terms, the legalAWRs will not
cohere completely with the moral AWRas.) Legal principles for
Dworkin can be characterized counterfactually as those principles that
would be correct moral principles in a world in which the morally
incorrect past decisions were morally correct.9 ° To illustrate the
claim graphically, for a judge confronting, say, Plessy v. Ferguson91
and similar decisions, the legal principles immanent in those
decisions are those principles that would be morally correct in a world
in which "separate but equal" were morally correct.
I have argued in several other works that Dworkin's account of
legal principles, even if coherent-compare it with "What would seals
be in a world in which porpoises were fish?"-renders legal principles
normatively unattractive and ontologically queer.92 Legal principles
87 See DWORKIN, supra note 7, at 238-50.
' See Alexander, supra note 8, at 31-32, 37-42. See also Alexander, supra note 82,
at 426-34.
89 See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 22-39 (1977) (arguing that
judges use principles, not rules, to decide cases); see also DWORKIN, supra note 7, at 238-
50 (explaining the process that judges use to discover immanent legal principles).
" SeeAlexander & Kress, supra note 82, at 288 n.47 (arguing that "[s]uch a counter-
factual approach is in fact the best description of the dominant methodology for
dealing with precedential constraint").
9' 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
92 See sources cited supra note 82.
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do not have the virtues of bright-line rules, which, even if not morally
optimal, provide clear guidance. Nor do legal principles have the
virtue of correct moral principles, since they are not necessarily
morally correct. Moreover, the best answer to the counterfactual
question that describes legal principles-what would be morally
correct in a world in which moral errors were not errors-is "act on
correct moral principles except in past cases of moral error."93 That
injunction is no different in any practical sense from an injunction
to follow correct moral principles, which requires the method of
reflective equilibrium, not ARIL.
Correct moral principles will never dictate their own aban-
donment. They might dictate that we follow bright-line rules, even
at some moral cost in particular cases, in return for greater moral
benefits generally (moral costs and benefits calculated by reference
to the correct moral principles). Correct moral principles, however,
will reject all other purported justificatory principles as counterfeit.
Finally, cannot the value of equality support ARIL? In other
words, even if some past legal decisions are mistaken, does not the
moral principle that requires us to treat past and present litigants
"equally" thereby require us to abandon correct moral principles in
favor of principles that "fit" the past cases, including the mistaken
ones? Is not Dworkin's method, which is the best account of ARIL,
really what is morally required of us after all, rather than a perverse
departure from morality?
The argument from equality is Dworkin's strongest argument, but
it is fatally defective. To begin with, all conceptions of equality are
theory-dependent.94 That is, equality is not a free-floating moral
value, but instead must be cashed out in terms of a general normative
theory. There are Rawlsian, utilitarian, libertarian, and other
conceptions of equality. One does not abandon correct moral
principles to honor the demands of equality. Rather, one must refer
to correct moral principles to know what equality demands.
Even if that is so, could not the correct conception of equality
require us to acknowledge that past mistaken decisions exert
gravitational force on present litigants? In other words, could not the
correct conception of equality trump all the other moral principles
that would otherwise dictate renouncing past mistakes rather than
perpetuating their effects?
s See Alexander & Kress, supra note 82, at 304-06.
9" See id. at 294-95 (arguing that "equality" is not a free-standing concept, but rather
is theory-dependent); Alexander, supra note 82, at 426-31 (arguing the same point).
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Again, the answer is no, and for two reasons. First, if in the past
there have been both morally incorrect decisions and morally correct
ones, as would be expected, equality of past and present litigants
points in opposite directions. One cannot treat present litigants
"equally" with those in the past mistaken cases without also treating
them "unequally" with those in the past correct cases, and vice versa.
Second, and more importantly, past moral mistakes just do not
exert any equality claim on behalf of present similar decisions.95 If
it were otherwise, then putting one innocent person to death would
create some moral reason to put a second to death. And if enough
innocent persons were put to death, then the balance would be
tipped in favor of "equality," that is, in favor of putting still another
to death. But to argue this way would be absurd.
For these reasons, equality does not dictate that we abandon
correct moral principles in favor of legal principles immanent in the
cases. And without such legal principles, ARIL as a form of reasoning
collapses.
CONCLUSION
When we employ ARIL and ask which past cases are like and
unlike our own case, we need some norm that we can reference in
order to answer that question. If we are searching for a posited rule,
then we must look at court-stated rationales or legislative enactments.
In such a case, our reasoning will be deductive (from the rule to the
facts of our case), except when we need empirical reasoning (for
example, to determine legislative intent) to interpret an ambiguous
rule. If, on the other hand, we are searching for a norm that 'justi-
fies" the past cases, then, if correct moral principles do not do so,
nothing else will. Correct moral principles may be discovered
through exemplary reasoning, but not, as in ARIL, exemplary
reasoning based on the cases. Past mistakes-bad beginnings-make
ARIL impossible or perverse.
Although ARIL is perverse-a monster-it is also a phantasm. It
does not really exist, though the belief that it does can lead to
methodological error.
96
9 SeeAlexander, supra note 8, at 9-12 (arguing that past incorrectjudgments should
not be repeated simply to satisfy "equality" between past and present cases); see, e.g.,
source cited supra note 91 and accompanying text.
96 1 may seem to be equivocating here. Is ARIL impossible? Or is ARIL possible,
but perverse? Is my critique of ARIL ontological or normative? Is ARIL a phantom
or a real monster?
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On the subject of ARIL, we lawyers are like the man who, when
asked if he believed in adult baptism, replied, "Believe in it? Hell,
I've seen it done." We lawyers believe we have seen ARIL. In truth,
however, while we have seen moral reasoning, empirical reasoning,
deductive reasoning, and confused reasoning, we have not seen the
phantasm that makes lawyers dream of an autonomous law's empire.
The autonomy of law and law's methodology can only be a dream.
And when ARIL is the agent of law's autonomy, the dream is a
nightmare. ARIL, like Freddy Krueger,9 7 does not exist, and for that
we should be thankful.
I believe it is both. Although I would be content with my normative critique of
ARIL-after all, ARIL purports to be the method by which courts justify their
decisions-I believe my critique casts doubt on ARIL's existence as well, at least in the
following sense: A court may point out the similarities and dissimilarities between the
case before it and prior cases and conclude, based solely on the similarities and
dissimilarities, that the case before it is more "like" one set of prior cases than other
sets of prior cases. Because the relevance of those similarities and dissimilarities
remains unjustified, however, this version of ARIL lacks any rational force. Alterna-
tively, a court may establish criteria of relevance by citing either to a rule laid down
in the precedent cases or to correct moral principles (which are consistent with
precedent cases only if the cases were decided morally correctly), both of which can
be justifiable, but neither of which is ARIL. Finally, the court may establish criteria
of relevance by citing to "principles" immanent in the precedent cases. Such principles
are, as I have shown, normatively unattractive. Beyond that, normatively unattractive
normative principles have a queer ontological nature. See Alexander & Kress, supra
note 82, at 303 n.96. Although we can speak, for example, of the "existence" of moral
principles that we reject-the principle of utilitarianism might be a good example-
such references make sense primarily when the "principles" to which they point
operate in rule-like fashion, either as a master rule or as a lexically ordered set of rules.
When, however, the morally incorrect principles to which these statements refer are
supposed to have a dimension of weight-or (what I believe translates as the same
thing), when these principles are supposed to answer the question "What would be
the morally correct outcomes in a world in which some morally incorrect outcomes
in our world were morally correct?"-I believe they become incoherent and thereby
lack existential plausibility.
9' See NIGHTMARE ON ELM STREET (New Line Cinema 1985).
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